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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the relationship between the economic turmoil generated by the 
Great Recession and the increase of secessionism. Some authors have stressed 
that the Great Recession triggered profound changes in territorial preferences and, 
in the context of a conflict between the centre and the periphery, fuelled 
secessionism as a radical shift of the institutional setup. Nevertheless, other 
researchers have remarked that a deep recession may enhance the status quo bias 
and decrease the likelihood of radical changes. Our paper aims at contributing to this 
debate by analysing the case of Catalonia. We use an aggregate and an individual-
level empirical design to explore the relationship between the deterioration of the 
economic situation and the increase of preferences for secession among the Catalan 
population. The findings from the analysis of our empirical models do not support the 
hypothesis that the effects of the Great Recession had any significant impact on 
political preferences in Catalonia.    
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1. Introduction 
A common view among commentators and electoral pundits is that economic 
crises are strong determinants of decentralization demands or support for secession. 
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Economic downturnsthe argument goesbring about popular discontent, polarize 
political positions and trigger centrifugal forces that fan the desire for autonomy or 
outright independence. Many examples of this can be found in the press, especially 
referred to the effects of the Great Recession in a number of European regions. One 
can come across sentences like To many observers, the disintegration forces that 
characterize Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders are just the by-products of Europes 
economic despair (World Economic Forum, August 2014).1  
Despite its ubiquity, this line of reasoning has gathered little attention in academic 
forums. Some authors have hinted that economic reasons could be important 
determinants for the growth of secessionism (see Rico and Liñeira, 2014, Boylan, 
2015, Muñoz and Tormos, 2015 and Hopkin 2016), but there is not any research 
providing solid empirical evidence to evaluate the hypothesis. While the grievances 
exacerbated by economic recessions might indeed boost secessionist support, a 
theoretical argument can also be made in the other way round, namely, that 
economic crises lead citizens to accept the status quo, as individuals deem 
secession as too risky when economic times turn turbulent. 
We aim at contributing to this debate by analysing the relationship between the 
effects of the Great Recession and the increase in the support to secessionist 
demands in Catalonia. At least since 2010 there has been a remarkable upsurge in 
the support to the creation of a new Catalan independent state among the population 
of Catalonia. This increase, however, varies substantially across the Catalan 
geography. Moreover, the Great Recession had a heterogeneous impact across the 
Catalan territory, affecting some places more than others. We exploit this variability 
to examine the effect of the economic crisis on the increase (or decrease) in support 
for independence. To capture the intensity of the recession and analyse it at both the 
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aggregate and individual levels we use several economic indicators. Our article, 
therefore, contributes to existing research by going beyond the political factors 
traditionally emphasized in the literature (recent contributions are Barrio and 
Rodríguez-Teruel, 2017 and Liñeira and Medina, 2017). 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of unemployment and support for independence in 
Catalonia. Just eyeballing the graph, one might be tempted to conclude that the 
first factor caused the second. The main objective of our research is to scrutinize this 
thesis with the data at hand. Thus, we take advantage of the variation of economic 
variables and data from surveys and electoral outcomes in order to explore whether 
there is any relationship between the surge of secessionism and the main economic 
effects of the Great Recession. Our empirical models capture the impact of the 
economic consequences of the Great Recession on the growth of support for 
independence in the political preferences of the Catalan citizenry.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of unemployment in Catalonia and support for independence 
(2006-2015) 
 
Note: Unemployment data comes from Eurostat. Data for support for secession 
comes from the CEO surveys.  
  
Our findings do not support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
the negative economic consequences of the Great Recession and the increase in 
support for independence among the citizens of Catalonia. At the aggregate level, 
we show that higher levels of destruction of jobs, disappearance of firms, or income 
loss in different municipalities do not appear to lead to higher increases in 
secessionist support. At the individual level, our findings reveal that individuals with 
low income, who are unemployed, belong to the middle class, or assess negatively 
their personal economic situation are not more likely to support independence. All in 
all, our research casts a shadow over the widespread opinion suggesting that, as the 
economy gets better, the pro-secession tide in Catalonia will recede. 
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2. Theory 
The literature offers three main explanations to understand why some individuals 
support the creation of a new state, while others are opposed to it. A first strand of 
research has analysed the relationship between support for secession and attitudes 
or partisan preferences. This includes the study of the connection between backing 
for independence and attitudes towards the European Union (Dardanelli, 2005) or 
how support for secession varies when individuals consider different alternative 
institutional arrangements (Serrano, 2013). As for parties, previous works have 
mainly analysed how party strategies shape citizens preferences for secession 
(Richez and Bodet, 2012).  
A second group of scholars have looked at the role of regional identity/ies and its 
relationship with pro-secessionist predisposition (Serrano, 2013). The point of 
departure is that the regional versus statist dimension is the main factor driving an 
individuals support for secession (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, Guinjoan and Rodon, 
2016a).  
Finally, and most importantly for this article, secession has also been associated 
with the economic dimension. The link between support for independence and 
economic factors has been traditionally conceptualized in three interrelated ways. 
Firstly, high levels of support for independence have been linked to economic 
deprivation. For instance, Rico and Liñeira argue that the rise of Catalan 
secessionism may thus be a particularised manifestation of the growing political 
dissatisfaction that was ultimately produced by the economic crisis [] the pro-
independence tide will therefore probably recede as the economy recovers (2014: 
273). In Scotland, previous research (McKendrick et al, 2014) has shown that the 
increase in secessionist secondment is partly due to the harsh austerity measures 
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implemented in the region during the eighties. According to this reasoning, people 
suffering the effects of the economic crisis cease to trust the central institutions and 
start considering breaking up the status quo and embrace the necessity to create a 
new state. On a related note, increasing secessionism has also been linked to the 
relative impoverishment of the middle classes caused by economic recessions 
(Dowling, 2018; and on the general relationship between class and support for 
independence, see McCrone and Paterson, 2002 and Serrano, 2013). 
Secondly, increasing support for independence has been shown to be linked to 
positive expectations about the future of the regions economy. The basic tenet of 
this line of reasoning is that pro-secessionist individuals tend to think that the 
economy (and, as a result, their economic status) would be better-off if the region 
was able to create its own state (Blais and Nadeau, 1992, Clarke et al, 2004, Howe, 
1998, Boylan, 2015). In other words, people will opt for an independent state if they 
perceive it can serve to achieve their economic goals. 
Thirdly, politicians might strategically use economic recessions for their political 
advantage. The economic crisis might provide regionalist parties with a strong 
argument to blame the central government for bad economic outcomes, raising 
demands for fiscal and political autonomy to mobilise their voters and send a 
message that territorial accommodation is no longer possible (Bosco and Verney, 
2012, Rico, 2012 and Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel, 2017). The interaction between 
the economic shock and the political dynamics associated to it can exacerbate latent 
secessionist demands. If this is the case, the effect of the economic crisis on 
secessionist demands would be indirect and positive and should be higher in places 
where the economic shock has been more severe and where political dynamics are 
more prevalent. Empirically, this means that the effects of the economic situation 
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should be larger in places where political entrepreneurs consider they have better 
opportunities to make advances in their political objectives.  
Despite the popularity of these arguments, the empirical evidence is mixed. For 
instance, at the aggregate level, Sorens (2005) finds that the economic opportunities 
brought about by globalization are positively related to secessionist vote growth. 
Serrano (2013) shows that those wanting a high degree of fiscal autonomy for the 
Catalan region are significantly more likely to support independence. Muñoz and 
Tormos (2015) portrays a different picture. Using a survey experiment, they show 
that economic considerations play an independent role on support for secession, but 
only for citizens with ambivalent identity positions. Similarly, and using data for 
Catalonia, Guinjoan and Rodon (2016b) shows that, although support for 
independence grew for all socio-economic groups during the period 2008-2014, this 
growth was larger (smaller) for employed (unemployed) individuals and middle and 
high (low) income groups. Furthermore, the empirical evidence provided by Boylan 
(2015) suggests that the increase of independence aspirations do not seem to 
materialise from poor outlooks on the regions economic performance or employment 
status, which goes against the idea that the Great Recession and higher 
unemployment rates are the main culprits of the surge of secessionism in Catalonia. 
Summing up, the empirical evidence on the relationship between the effect of 
economic crisis and secessionist demands is far from being compelling. On top of 
this, one could argue that the theoretical case for it is not conclusive either. Thus, 
while most previous works emphasize the existence of a positive relationship 
between economic crisis and secessionist demands, they do not contemplate that a 
theoretical connection can also be made between economic crises and the 
acceptance of the status quo. A rich tradition of psychological research, going back 
8 
 
to Fromm ([1941] 2001), argues that insecurity and uncertainty, as plausible by-
products of job or income losses, are associated with adopting conservative stances 
and acceptance of the status quo. In other words, economic instability makes people 
more willing to accept the current state of events. This might be the case if the 
economic disruption brought about by the crisis increased the levels of uncertainty 
faced by voters and made them more reluctant to take risks or concentrate on the 
potential losses due to political changes. Thus, according to Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991) more uncertainty about the outcome of a big change in policy results into a 
larger status quo bias that makes political change less likely. Also, a more 
conservative attitude towards risk might increase the salience of the worst-case 
scenario in the decision-making process, blocking political reforms (Nadeau et al, 
1999). Finally, Alesina and Passarelli (2015) argues that more loss averse voters are 
more likely to favour the maintenance of the status quo.  
3. Catalonia 2006-2015: a changing landscape 
3.1. Political landscape 
At the end of the XIXth century a national and cultural renaissance movement 
was born in Catalonia, also prompting demands for political devolution and greater 
autonomy. This crystallized in two early experiments of Catalan self-government 
during the periods 1914-23 and 1932-1939. Both were abruptly interrupted after two 
military coups détat in 1923 and 1936. The latter marked the beginning of the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and the Francoist military dictatorship (1939-1975). 
After democracy was re-established in Spain in 1978, Catalonia recovered its 
self-government institutions in 1979. This was the start of a period during which the 
successive Catalan governments fought to gradually increase the number and scope 
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of powers under its control. During the process the Catalan institutions frequently 
encountered the resistance of the Spanish government and political parties, leading 
to a situation in which institutional conflicts were continuous and, often, settled by the 
judgements of the Spanish Constitutional Court (see Guibernau, 2014, and Cuadras-
Morató, 2016). 
Until 2010, the proportion of Catalan citizens who manifested a preference for 
independence in opinion polls was never higher than 20 per cent. Since 2010, 
though, this figure augmented dramatically and surveys taken around 2015 suggest 
that the support for independence was rarely below 45 per cent. On a similar note, 
the number of MPs in the Catalan Parliament elected under an openly secessionist 
platform went from 14 in 2010 to an absolute majority of 72 after the election of 
2015. 
Many authors have mentioned the long and convoluted process of elaboration, 
negotiation and approval of the Reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 
(2004-2010) as a turning point in the recent history of the political relationship 
between Catalonia and Spain (see Rico and Liñeira, 2014 and Muñoz and Tormos, 
2015). The whole process ended in June 2010 with a judgement of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court which declared unconstitutional important parts of the Statute. 
This ruling is regarded by many as a key moment in the emergence of secessionism 
in contemporary Catalan politics. Later attempts of the Catalan government to 
negotiate with the Spanish authorities a new tax-sharing deal which resembled the 
clearly advantageous agreement of the Basque Country and Navarre (two regions in 
Spain that enjoy greater financial autonomy) were unsuccessful. This added to the 
frustration of the ruling of the Statute and might also explain the increase of 
secessionism. 
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From this point on, the intent of holding a self-determination referendum became 
the new bone of contention between the Catalan and Spanish governments. The 
Catalan government and Parliament did not reach a political agreement with their 
Spanish counterparts to allow for the holding of a non-binding referendum. In the 
end, the Catalan executive decided, in November 2014, to organize an unofficial 
referendum (2.3 million people voted on the independence of Catalonia). Later, the 
Catalan government decided to call an early election on September 2015 and frame 
it as a de facto vote on Catalan independence. Voting for the two lists that explicitly 
had independence in their electoral manifestos would be the equivalent to a Yes in 
a self-determination referendum.  
 
3.2. Economic landscape 
The years before the Great Recession were characterized as a period of 
remarkable prosperity in both Catalonia and Spain. The rate of economic growth in 
Catalonia reached an annual average of 3.7 per cent during the period 2002-2007 
(3.5 per cent in Spain). Also, average yearly employment growth for the same period 
reached 4 per cent (4.1 in Spain), which allowed the unemployment rate to reach 
unprecedented low values. 
Suddenly things turned sour and the economic international climate became 
extremely unfavourable. This, together with some huge built-in imbalances of the 
Catalan and Spanish economies (especially a huge speculative real state bubble 
that crashed catastrophically) foreboded a very traumatic economic adjustment. 
Indeed, the economic shock of the Great Recession and its aftermath had similar 
dramatic effects in both Catalonia and Spain. For a start, after average negative 
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growth of 1.5 per cent (1.4 in Spain) during the period 2008-2013, in 2015 levels of 
real GDP were still below the 2007 values (Figure 2a). The labour market in the two 
economies experienced a severe process of employment destruction during which 
almost 17 per cent of jobs existing in 2008 had been wiped out in 2013 (Figure 2b). 
That year, the unemployment rate reached a yearly maximum of 23.1 per cent (26.1 
in Spain). Additionally, the low levels of economic activity during the period caused 
the reduction of the number of firms operating in Catalonia (Figure 2c). Things 
started going back to normality and economic growth resumed in 2014. 
 
  
a) Evolution of real GDP in 
Catalonia, Spain and the EU 
(2006=100) 
b) Evolution of employment in 
Catalonia, Spain and the EU 
(2006=100) 
 
c) Number of firms with employees in Catalonia (2006=100) 
Figure 2: Evolution of economic indicators in Catalonia, Spain and the EU (2006-
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2015) 
 
Note: Sources for Panels a and c (Idescat), Panel b (Eurostat). 
 
4. Data 
Our empirical analysis has two parts.2 In the first part, we examine the effect of 
the economic crisis on secessionist preferences at the aggregate level (municipality). 
In particular, we exploit the heterogeneous impact of the Great Recession on 
different municipalities and analyse whether this economic shock is related with 
variations in support for secession. In the second part, we turn to individual level 
data and analyse whether and how different negative economic circumstances are 
related to pro-secessionist support. 
  
4.1. Aggregate-level analysis  
In the first part of the empirical analysis, our outcome of interest is the difference 
in the support for independence between 2006 and 2015 at the municipality level. 
The reason we take these years is that they are the regional election years 
immediately before and after the economic crisis period. Since support for secession 
at the municipality level is not directly measured, we estimate it based on a 
combination of election results and survey responses. The logic is as follows. On a 
first step, we take data on the secessionist support among voters of the different 
political parties in 2006 and in 2015 in each of the four Catalan provinces. This is 
done using all surveys published by the CEO in the years 2006 and 2015. We 
consider independence supporters those who answered An Independent state to 
the question What do you think that the relationship between Catalonia and Spain 
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should be?. On a second step, we gather electoral results at the municipality level 
for the 2006 and 2015 Catalan regional elections. Finally, on a third step we combine 
the information from surveys and election results and calculate the percentage of 
pro-independence supporters for each party and add all of them to have the 
aggregate number for each municipality. We construct two different municipality-level 
indicators: the first indicator estimates the percentage of secessionist supporters 
among voters while the second takes into account the whole electoral census. 
Section B in the online Appendix provides further details of the estimation procedure. 
After estimating the percentage of people in favour of independence at the 
municipality level in 2006 and 2015, we calculate the growth rate, our outcome of 
interest. Figure 3 displays the distribution of the dependent variable. It shows that the 
value of the mode of the distribution is around 255 per cent (when we only consider 
voters) or 180 per cent (when we also consider abstainers).3 While the increase in 
secessionist support is remarkable, there is also substantial variation across 
municipalities.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of the growth rate of estimated support for independence 
between 2006 and 2015 across municipalities 
 
Note: Estimated support for secession: Centre for Opinion Studies. 2006: Opinion 
Barometer 363. 2015: Opinion Barometer 804. Electoral data is retrieved from the 
Catalan Ministry of Governance and Public Administration.  
 
We complement the aggregate-level analysis by using an additional 
dependent variable. This indicator captures support for secession at the municipality 
level as expressed directly in surveys. CEO surveys published in 2006 and 2015 
contained information about the residence of respondents.4 We calculate the 
percentage of respondents that want An Independent state on the territorial 
preference question in each of the municipalities appearing in the surveys. 
Unfortunately, not all Catalan municipalities were (randomly) included in them and, 
for some cases, the number of respondents was very low. While the first concern 
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should be alleviated by the design of the survey (CEO performs stratified random 
samples with territorial quotas), the second may bias our results by including 
municipalities in which the variation is not correctly estimated. In order to deal with 
this problem, we select only municipalities in which the number of interviewed 
individuals was higher than 15 (n=228).5  
 
Measuring the intensity of the economic crisis 
Unemployment 
The data on unemployment available at municipality level is registered 
unemployment, that is, the number of workers who are registered as unemployed in 
the public job service offices. This data is accessible for the whole period 2006-2015, 
during which the number of registered unemployed workers more than doubled and 
rose above half million in 2015. 
Employment 
The number of affiliated workers to the Social Security residing in the 
municipality is taken as the measure to approximate employment (this is available 
only since 2008). Additionally, we calculate the number of affiliated workers to the 
Social Security based on the location of the corresponding contribution account 
(which normally matches the establishment where the worker is employed). The 
obvious disadvantage of this measure is that many employees counted in one 
location might not reside (and, hence, vote) in the same place. The main advantages 
are that the data is available for the whole period 2006-2015 and can be 
disaggregated by economic sectors (e.g. construction). 
Number of firms 
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The number of firms in each municipality is approximated by the number of 
contribution accounts to the Social Security. The figure is only an approximation of 
the number of firms in each municipality because some firms might have an 
establishment in one location and no contribution account there if its workers are 
associated with a contribution account of the same firm in a different location. This 
data is accessible for the whole period 2006-2015, during which the total number of 
firms decreased by more than 12 per cent. 
The data on employed and unemployed workers and quotation centres is 
available quarterly. In order to compute the difference between 2006 (or 2008) and 
2015, we choose the value corresponding to the third quarter (September) because 
the regional elections took place in this month and also to avoid seasonality 
problems. 
Gross Disposable Household Income 
The Statistical Office in Catalonia (Idescat) publishes an estimation of the 
Gross Disposable Household Income for all municipalities larger than 5,000 
inhabitants plus all the county (comarca) capitals. This data is only available for the 
period 2008-2013, during which per capita income decreased by 4.3 per cent in 
Catalonia. 
 
Control variables 
Finally, our empirical models also control for some important factors at the 
municipality level that can affect the relationship between economic indicators and 
support for secession. The first key control is the percentage of Catalan citizens born 
in other Spanish regions. As previous literature has consistently shown (Serrano, 
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2013 and Rodon, 2015), in places where this percentage is higher, support for 
independence is lower. The second control is the percentage of population who are 
65 years and older, as support for secession is negatively related to age (Muñoz and 
Tormos, 2014). The third control, population density, aims at tackling the urban-rural 
divide (Rodon, 2015). The fourth indicator controls for whether the mayor after the 
2011 local election belonged to a pro-sovereign party (CiU, ERC or CUP) or 
otherwise.6 This indicator aims at controlling for a (supposedly) higher increase in 
secessionist support in places where pro-sovereign parties govern and a lower 
increase in places where they do not. Finally, an important control is the vote share 
obtained by CiU and ERC in 2006.7 As explained before, our outcome of interest is 
the growth rate in the estimated support for independence between 2006 and 2015,. 
Controlling for the vote share of these parties in 2006 is important in order to avoid 
automatic effects and to consider the baseline level of support for secession. Some 
changes in the way we measure support for secession between 2006 and 2015 are 
simply caused by the automatism of the changes in the percentage of voters for 
each party who, as surveys indicate, support independence (even if, for example, 
there was not any change in electoral behaviour, i.e., the percentage of votes to 
each party did not change at all). This means that the variation in support for 
independence could depend strongly on the baseline level, that is, on the initial vote 
share for each political party in 2006. In some municipalities secessionist support 
was already high in 2006, a ceiling effect that limits the secessionist growth rate. 
Our empirical strategy is based on conventional OLS regressions. In addition, 
models include region fixed-effects, which effectively mean that we are comparing 
the intensity of the economic crisis in municipalities within a specific region.8 
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4.2 Individual-level analysis 
In this second part of our empirical analysis, we look at the effect of an 
individuals economic circumstances on the likelihood of supporting secession. We 
use all surveys published by the CEO between 2006 and 2015. In this part, the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator that identifies whether an individual 
supports secession (1) or not (0). In line with the theory developed above, we use 
five explanatory variables aiming at capturing individuals negative economic 
circumstances from five different angles: a) the respondent is unemployed; b) he/she 
earns less than 1,000 a month; c) he/she thinks that his/her personal economic 
situation is worse than in the previous year; d) he/she thinks that unemployment is 
the most important problem facing Catalonia; and e) he/she considers himself/herself 
as middle class. In this empirical part, we run logistic regressions, which also include 
standard control variables. 
The online Appendix provides further details of the operationalization, sources 
and summary statistics of the variables employed in both the aggregate- and 
individual-level analyses. 
5. Results 
This section contains the main empirical findings. We proceed by showing first 
the aggregate-level results and, on a second step, the individual-level findings. 
 
5.1. Aggregate-level analysis  
Models M1 to M5 in Table 1 run different specifications with the independent 
variables tackling different dimensions of the impact of the Great Recession. M1 
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includes the growth rate of unemployed workers between 2006 and 2015, M2 the 
growth rate of workers registered to the Social Security between 2008 and 2015 (our 
proxy for employment), and M3 the growth rate of registered workers in the 
construction industry (a sector severely affected by the economic crisis) between 
2006 and 2015. As the estimated coefficients illustrate, none of the indicators is 
statistically significant. M4 includes the growth rate of per capita gross disposable 
household income between 2008 and 2013. The coefficient reveals that the growth 
rate in household income over this period is negatively related to the growth in 
support for secession. In other words, in municipalities where the household income 
increased at high rates (or decreased at slower rates), support for secession 
increased at relatively moderate rates (as shown in Figure 3 support for secession 
increased in every municipality). However, this model is based on a smaller number 
of municipalities (n=211), the time period for which data is available is different and 
the relationship is only significant at the 90 per cent level. Finally, M5 includes the 
growth rate of quotation centres between 2006 and 2015. The coefficient is again not 
statistically significant.  
All in all, our empirical models do not show a systematic statistically significant 
relationship between the (heterogeneous) impact of the economic crisis and variation 
in secessionist support. 
As for the control variables, they behave in the expected direction. The 
percentage of the Catalan citizens born in other Spanish regions is negatively related 
to the growth in secessionist support. The percentage of population aged 65 or more 
indicates that support for secession grew relatively faster in places with a higher 
percentage of this demographic group. Population density has a negative coefficient, 
showing that secessionism grew less in densely populated areas. As for 
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municipalities governed by a pro-sovereignty mayor, secessionist support increased 
more, although the relationship is only significant at the 90 per cent level. Finally, the 
variable vote share obtained by pro-sovereign parties in 2006 behaves 
inconsistently, although it is generally positive.9 
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M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
      
D Unemployed 2006-2015 0.003 
    
 
(0.01) 
    D Registered to the Social Security 2008-
2015 
 
-0.05 
   
  
(0.093) 
   D Registered to the Social Security 2006-
2015 
(Construction sector) 
  
-0.016 
  
   
(0.015) 
  D Gross disposable household income 
2008-2013 
   
-0.287+ 
 
    
(0.153) 
 
D Quotation centres 2006-2015 
    
0.035 
     
(0.025) 
% Catalan population born in other 
Spanish regions -5.810*** -5.899*** -5.611*** -5.759*** -5.631*** 
 
(0.287) (0.285) (0.289) (0.583) (0.287) 
% population 65 or more 1.629*** 1.528*** 1.435*** 3.391*** 1.361*** 
 
(0.203) (0.228) (0.203) (0.57) (0.200) 
Population density -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 0.000 -0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pro-sovereignty mayor 6.268* 6.337* 5.500* 4.561 6.668** 
 
(2.503) (2.473) (2.518) (2.986) (2.531) 
Vote share obtained by pro-sovereign 
parties in 2006 -0.034 -0.028 0.111 0.995** 0.067 
 
(0.143) (0.141) (0.142) (0.299) (0.141) 
Region Fixed-Effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Constant 216.27 218.68 206.06 120.64 211.52 
 (12.27) (12.21) (12.17) (23.84) (11.93) 
Observations 926 922 927 211 944 
R-squared 0.66 0.668 0.65 0.857 0.647 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 1: The effect of the economic crisis on the growth rate of preferences for 
secession  municipality-level analysis 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of estimated support for 
independence at the municipality level between 2006 and 2015.   
 
  
22 
 
 As explained in section 4, to complement our aggregate-level analysis we 
employ an alternative version of the variable that directly measures secessionist 
support at the municipality level. Using georeferenced surveys, we were able to 
calculate the percentage of people supporting An Independent state both in 2006 
and 2015 in each Catalan municipality. Although we lose a fair amount of 
observations, this measure can be interpreted as a more direct indicator of support 
for secession. In addition, the 228 municipalities for which we have information in the 
surveys represent most of the Catalan territory and population (observations are 
fairly balanced across space).   
When we employ this alternative measurement, results are consistent with 
what we found in Table 1. As displayed in Table 2, none of the economic indicators 
is significant. 
In addition, we further explore the interactive effects between the state of the 
economy and the political dynamics. As explained in section 2, negative economic 
shocks might have been used by political entrepreneurs in the pro-independence 
camp to increase the support for the secessionist project. This interactive effect can 
take place in two scenarios. First, in places where support for secession before the 
crisis was low. The economic crisis could have opened a window of opportunity for 
political entrepreneurs in the pro-independence camp to target those places. 
Second, in places governed by pro-secessionist parties. If an economic crisis occurs, 
pro-secession mayors can use the office to disseminate their political project. If both 
interactive effects are true, we should expect the effect of the crisis to be greater in 
places where support for secession was low before the economic crisis or in places 
governed by pro-secession parties. Yet again, the interactions are not statistically 
significant.10 In other words, places negatively hit by the economic crisis and 
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governed by pro-secession mayors, or where support for secession was low before 
the crisis, did not experience a higher increase in secessionist support. Therefore, 
results show that the interaction between political dynamics and the economy did not 
change the (null) effect of the state of the economy on the increase of secessionist 
preferences. 
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M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
      
D Unemployed 2006-2015 0.06 
    
 
(0.393) 
    
D Registered to the Social Security 2008-2015 
 
2.26 
   
  
(1.924) 
   D Registered to the Social Security 2006-2015 
(Construction sector) 
  
-0.212 
  
   
(0.606) 
  
D Gross disposable household income 2008-2013 
   
-0.527 
 
    
(2.356) 
 
D Quotation centres 2006-2015 
    
-0.281 
     
(1.139) 
% Catalan population born in other Spanish regions 4.735 5.373 4.313 -3.479 4.298 
 
(5.336) (5.277) (5.311) (8.82) (5.385) 
% population 65 or more -9.007* -6.183 -8.973* 3.043 -9.071* 
 
(3.72) (4.426) (3.721) (8.865) (3.724) 
Population density 0.01 0.011 0.01 0.005 0.01 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Pro-sovereignty mayor 50.553 49.915 50.645 83.957+ 50.723 
 
(35.44) (35.313) (35.422) (45.916) (35.446) 
Vote share obtained by pro-sovereign parties in 2006 1.292 0.779 1.252 -2.402 1.269 
 
(2.726) (2.737) (2.714) (4.246) (2.715) 
Constant 92.772 85.345 90.431 175.753 97.233 
 
(231.962) (227.532) (229.289) (329.986) (228.075) 
Region Fixed-Effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 228 228 228 127 228 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.09 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 2: The effect of the economic crisis on preferences for secession (surveys)  
municipality-level analysis 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of support for independence at the 
municipality level. Support for secession is extracted from different surveys carried 
out by the CEO institute. 
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 5.2. Individual-level analysis  
A final concern about the previous analyses has to do with the aggregate 
nature of the data. Changes in secessionist support over time might be going 
towards different directions, which might cancel out the effect at the aggregate level. 
In addition, aggregate changes may mask different individual changes. To 
strengthen our findings, in the final part of the analysis we turn to individual-level 
data. Using the CEO surveys for each year between 2006 and 2015, we analyse 
whether support for secession is significantly larger among individuals who 1) are 
unemployed; 2) earn less than 1,000 a month; 3) assess their personal economic 
situation during the previous year as negative; 4) think that unemployment is the 
most important problem facing Catalonia; 5) and consider themselves as part of the 
middle class. Most importantly, if there is an effect, we should observe it when the 
economic crisis started (i.e. from 2009 onwards). 
Figure 4 shows the marginal effect for each indicator on support for 
secession11. Results are generally consistent with the aggregate analyses. 
Individuals that experienced negative economic circumstances, either before or 
during the economic crisis, are not more likely to support secession. Thus, being 
unemployed, earning less than 1,000 a month, assessing the personal economic 
situation as negative or self-identifying as middle class do not generally have a 
statistically significant impact on secessionist support. The only minor exception is 
when we employ the indicator unemployment is the most important problem facing 
Catalonia. The coefficient is significant in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Yet, it goes in the 
opposite direction: those who consider that unemployment is the most important 
problem are less likely to be in favour of independence. Overall, Figure 4 confirms 
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that there is not a significant systematic effect of negative economic circumstances 
on the likelihood of supporting independence. 
 
 
Figure 4: The effect of negative economic circumstances on support for secession 
(marginal effects) 
 
Note: Coefficients represent the marginal effect of being unemployed (top-left), 
earning less than 1,000 a month (top-right), assessing negatively the personal 
economic situation (centre-left), considering unemployment as the most important 
problem facing the country (centre-right), and self-identifying as middle class 
(bottom-left) on individuals support for secession. Marginal effects are extracted 
from a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is whether the 
respondents main territorial preference is secession (1) versus the rest (0). All 
explanatory variables are dummies. All models control for respondents national 
identity, left-right self-placement, gender, age, and household income. 
 
All in all, we could not find any relationship between the effects of the 
economic crisis and secessionist support. This is true when we look at different 
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dimensions of the Great Recession and different ways to measure support for 
secession and when we use different levels of analysis. 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
We have run several additional robustness checks in order to control for 
plausible confounders. First, at the aggregate-level analysis, we divided the 
municipalities into different quartiles, according to population. Most Catalan localities 
are very small and secessionist support may follow different dynamics in small towns 
as compared to urban areas. This approach, however, leads to the same results: the 
effect of the economic variables remains statistically not significant, irrespective of 
the municipality size. 
Second, also using aggregate-level data, we employed additional economic 
indicators that, while being less accurate, reflect relevant dimensions of the Great 
Recession. In particular, since the construction industry was severely affected by the 
economic consequences of the crisis, it seems appropriate to look at the growth rate 
of buildings initiated and finished and the growth rate of the number of firms in the 
construction industry. In both cases the results are exactly the same. In addition, 
when we include other controls in the models, such as the percentage of citizens 
who speak Catalan, the percentage of non-Spanish nationals in the municipality or 
party polarization at the local level, results also remain unaffected. 
Finally, both at the aggregate and at the individual-level, we ran different model 
specifications, such as a censored regression model or a geographically weighted 
regression, to check the robustness of our findings. Results are also consistent.  
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6. Conclusions 
The existence of a relationship between the economic turmoil generated by the 
Great Recession and the increase of secessionism is not completely obvious from a 
theoretical point of view. On the one hand, many authors have stressed that the 
Great Recession triggered profound changes in political attitudes and preferences 
fueling voters discontent with the political system and, in the context of a conflict 
between the centre and the periphery, favoured secessionism as a radical shift of the 
institutional setup. On the other hand, a deep economic recession may make voters 
more accommodating with the status quo and more reluctant to take radical stances 
which might be regarded as too risky in a context of economic insecurity. Our paper 
intends to evaluate empirically this hypothesis and complements existing research 
about the increase in secessionist preferences, which has been focused on the most 
part on evaluating the impact of political factors. This article contributes to filling this 
gap in the literature by analysing the Catalan case, one of the most pressing modern 
examples in the world of a strong secessionist movement in a liberal democracy. 
Our empirical design is developed in two parts (aggregate and individual-level) 
and leverages the variation of economic variables and data from surveys and 
electoral outcomes at the level of municipalities in Catalonia to explore whether there 
is any relationship between the surge of secessionism and the main economic 
effects of the Great Recession. 
Our findings are conclusive and robust across models: there is not any 
relationship between economic variables and the increase in support for secession, 
both at the aggregate and at the individual-level. Neither of the different dimensions 
of the economic crisis that we operationalize (e.g. unemployment, firms closures, 
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income loss, or low salaries) has a statistically significant effect on the variation of 
secessionist support. 
Finally, our research sheds some light on the current debate between those who 
think that the pro-secession tide in Catalonia is a by-product of the Great Recession 
and might recede as the economy gets better and those who argue that it is a 
symptom of a deeper political conflict and, as such, will probably stay the same 
unless there are big political changes in Spain. 
 
Funding. Cuadras-Moratós work was funded by the Ministerio de Economía y 
Competitividad (Spanish Government) under grants ECO2014-55555-P and 
SEV-2015-0563. 
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7. Endnotes 
                                            
1
 Campanella, Edoardo Why secessionism is on the rise in Europe, 14 August 
2014. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/08/secession-scotland-catalonia-
referendum-europe/. See also Hallindan, Conn How Ethnic Tensions and Economic 
Crisis Have Strengthened Europes Secession Movements, 9 April 2014. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-ethnic-tensions-and-economic-crisis-have-
strengthened-europes-secession-movements/ and, for a different view, Dardanelli, 
Paolo Recession is only one explanation for the drive for secession, 24 November 
2012. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/24/recession-only-one-
explanation-secession. 
2 Datasets and replication materials are available at [[LINK]]. 
3 Since both estimations provide similar results, from this point onwards we will focus 
on the latter. 
4 We use four surveys published in 2006 (8,400 cases) and five in 2015 (10,000 
cases).    
5 If we move up or down the 15 cases threshold results are still robust.  
6
 Table C in the Appendix provides details of all political parties and their stance on 
the independence debate. 
7 These two parties competed separately in the 2006 election and formed the bulk of 
JxS, the main pro-secession coalition in the 2015 election.  
8 Regions correspond to vegueries, administrative territorial jurisdictions that 
represent symbolic areas of reference. There are 7 vegueries. If we employ other 
geographical areas (such as provinces) results are robust.   
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9 One reason for this inconsistency is that the vote share received by pro-sovereign 
parties in 2006 is positively correlated with pro-sovereign mayors. When we remove 
the second variable, the coefficient of the vote share received by pro-sovereign 
parties is always positive and significant. All the other results are robust.  
10
 Results can be seen in the Appendix (Table G). For the sake of simplicity, we have 
only included the interactions with the main economic indicators in our principal 
empirical specification (the remaining interactions show the same pattern).  
11 Logit models include several control variables. Operationalization and full 
estimates are included in the Appendix (Tables H-L). 
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Appendix 
A. Data description 
The following tables provide basic descriptive information of the data employed both 
in the aggregate and the individual-level analyses.  
Table A: Variables employed in the aggregate-level analyses 
Variable Source 
Election 
results 2006 
and 2015 
Department of Government. Generalitat de Catalunya 
http://governacio.gencat.cat/ca/pgov_ambits_d_actuacio/pgov_eleccions/p
gov_dades_electorals/ 
CEO surveys Centre dEstudis dOpinio. 
http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages/index.html 
Surveys employed: 
2006: BOP 346, 358, 363, 367. 
2015: BOP 774, 795, 804. 
Unemployed Generalitat de Catalunya 
http://observatoritreball.gencat.cat/ca 
Registered to 
the Social 
Security 
Generalitat de Catalunya 
http://observatoritreball.gencat.cat/ca 
 
Gross 
disposable 
household 
income  
Idescat, http://idescat.cat/ 
Quotation 
centres 
Generalitat de Catalunya 
http://observatoritreball.gencat.cat/ca 
% population 
born in other 
Spanish 
regions 
Idescat, http://idescat.cat/ 
% population 
65 or more 
Idescat, http://idescat.cat/ 
Population 
density 
Idescat, http://idescat.cat/ 
Pro-
sovereignty 
mayor 
Department of Government. Generalitat de Catalunya 
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Table B. Variables employed in the individual-level analyses 
Variable Categories 
Support for secession 1: Supports secession, 0: he/she does not support 
secession 
Unemployed 1: Unemployed seeking for a job, 0: Other 
employment status categories 
Earn less than 1,000 a month 1: Respondent earns less than 1,000 a month, 0: 
the rest. 
Retrospective personal economic 
situation 
1: Respondent thinks his/her personal economic 
situation is worse than last year, 0: Respondent 
thinks his/her personal economic situation is better 
or the same than last year 
Unemployment as the most important 
problem 
1: Respondent thinks the most important problem 
facing Catalonia nowadays is unemployment, 0: the 
rest. 
Social class 1: Respondent considers he/she belongs to the 
middle class, 0: the rest. 
Subjective National Identification 1 (I feel only Spanish) to 5 (I feel only Catalan) 
Ideology 1 (Extreme left) to 10 (Extreme right) 
Gender 1 Men, 0 Women 
Monthly household income (after 
taxes) 
1 (Less than 1000 euros) to 6 (More than 5000 
euros) 
Vote for CiU, ERC, SI or CUP 1 Respondent voted for CiU, ERC, SI or CUP in the 
closest regional elections; 0 otherwise 
Age (continuous variable) 
Vegueria (Region) 7 different regions 
 
In the individual-level analysis we have employed several surveys from the Centre 
dEstudis dOpinio (http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages/index.html). These are 
the following:  
 
2006: BOP 346, 358, 363, 367. 
2007: BOP 375, 391, 400, 404. 
2008: BOP 412, 419, 447, 466. 
2009: BOP 485, 499, 518, 544. 
2010: BOP 555, 581, 600, 612. 
2011: BOP 631, 652, 661. 
2012: BOP 677, 694, 705. 
2013: BOP 712, 723, 733. 
2014: BOP 758, 746. 
2015: BOP 774, 795, 804. 
 
All these surveys are freely available at the Institutes website.  
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Table C. Catalan Political parties 
Party Description 
CiU  Convergència i Unió (2006) Coalition of two centre right regionalist 
parties (CDC and UDC). It ruled the regional 
government during the periods 1980-2003 
and 2010-2015. Since 2010, in favour of 
holding a referendum of independence. 
Since 2012, CDC was favourable to 
independence, but UDC was not. The 
coalition came apart in 2015. 
ERC  Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(2006) 
Pro-independence left. Favourable to 
independence since the 1980s. 
JxS  Junts pel Si (2015) Electoral coalition between CDC, ERC and 
other small parties. Created before the 2015 
Catalan election. Favourable to 
independence.  
PSC (2006 and 2015)  Partit dels 
Socialistes de Catalunya 
Social democrat. Catalan branch of the 
Spanish socialist party. Against 
independence. 
ICV-EUiA (2006) / CSQP (2015)  Iniciativa 
per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i 
Alternativa / Catalunya Si Que es Pot 
Left and green coalition. Ambiguous position 
towards independence (it has no official 
position). According to its manifesto, the 
party is in favour of holding a referendum on 
independence, but only if it is agreed 
between the regional and the central 
governments. 
PP  Partido Popular (2006 and 2015) Right-wing party. Against independence. 
Cs  Ciudadanos (2006 and 2015) Liberal centrist. Against independence. 
CUP  Candidatura dUnitat Popular (2015) Anti-capitalist left. Favourable to 
independence. 
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Table D. Catalan election results in 2006 and in 2015 
 2006 2015 
Party % votes Seats % votes Seats 
CiU 31,52 48   
ERC 14.03 21   
PSC 26.82 37 12.72 16 
JxS   39.59 62 
PP 10.65 14 8.49 11 
ICV-EUiA 9.52 12   
CSQP   8.94 11 
Cs 3.03 3 17.9 25 
CUP   8.21 10 
Turnout 56.04  74.95  
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Table E: Summary of the variables employed in the aggregate-level analyses  
 Mean Sd Min Max N 
Growth rate in estimated support for 
independence, 2006-2015  
180.41 51.42 13.56 358.06 946 
Growth rate of unemployed, 2006-2015 63.11 98.11 -100 1400 926 
Growth rate registered to the Social 
Security 2008-2015 
-5.22 12.71 -45.25 57.61 922 
Growth rate registered to the Social 
Security 2006-2015 (construction sector) 
-39.66 68.00 -100 1500 927 
Growth rate in per capita gross disposable 
household income 2008-2013 
-10.05 13.42 -39.87 20.93 211 
Growth rate in quotation centres 2006-
2015 
1.67 42.51 -75 400 944 
Percentage of people born in other 
Spanish regions (2015) 
10.39 6.02 0.76 37.62 946 
Percentage of citizens 65 or more (2015) 21.32 6.36 7.54 50.98 946 
Population density 2015 398.66 1456.65 0.57 20336.37 946 
% pro-sovereign vote 2006 62.15 12.44 19.28 92.19 946 
Mayors sovereignty opinion on 
independence 
73% of mayors belong to a pro-
sovereignty party 
946 
Notes: (1) Sources in the Appendix. (2) We dropped two municipalities that were 
created between 2006 and 2015.  
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B. Support for independence at the municipality level  
estimation procedure 
 
As we mention in the manuscript, we use two main outcomes at the aggregate-level 
analysis: the percentage of secessionist supporters among voters and the 
percentage of secessionist supporters in the whole electoral census. These two 
indicators have been estimated using a combination of official election results and 
survey data.  
We have relied on an estimation procedure due to the lack of data directly capturing 
support for secession before and after the economic crisis. This is due to two main 
reasons. First, as compared to Scotland or Quebec, where secessionist preferences 
were directly revealed after an official referendum took place, Catalans had not yet 
voted in an official consultation and, therefore, data on the support for secession 
mainly comes from surveys, measuring citizens attitudes rather than actual 
behaviour. Second, support for secession is traditionally measured at the regional 
level and data at lower levels of geographical aggregation (such as municipalities) is 
scarce or does not exist.  
To circumvent this problem, as we mention before, we measure our variable of 
interest by combining electoral results and information extracted from surveys. The 
logic is as follows. On a first step, we take data on the secessionist support among 
voters of the different political parties in 2006 and in 2015 in each of the four Catalan 
provinces. This is done using all surveys published by the CEO in the years 2006 
and 2015.1 We consider independence supporters those who answered An 
Independent state to the question What do you think that the relationship between 
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Catalonia and Spain should be?.2 On a second step, we gather electoral results at 
the municipality level for the 2006 and 2015 Catalan regional elections. Finally, on a 
third step we combine the information from surveys and election results and 
calculate the percentage of pro-independence supporters for each party and add all 
of them to have the aggregate number for each municipality. For instance, lets 
consider that in a given municipality party A has received 100 votes and party B 200 
votes. We know from surveys that, in the specific province where this municipality is 
located, 30 per cent of party A and 51 per cent of party B supporters are in favour of 
independence. Therefore, support for secession would equal to 132 votes (43 per 
cent).3  
Table F shows the outcome of the first step of this estimation process, that is, 
support for independence across parties in 2006 and 2015 for the whole of 
Catalonia. As it can be seen, in 2006 only 14 per cent of respondents were in favour 
of independence, although this percentage varied across parties. Conversely, in 
2015 support for independence had increased substantially and it hit 41.1 per cent 
on aggregate. 
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Table F: Support for independence by party choice 
 2006 2015 
CiU 15.4 n.a. 
ERC 41.1 n.a. 
JxS n.a. 83.4 
PSC 6.8 1.4 
ICV-EUiA / CSQP 5.4 10.7 
PP 1.4 2.0 
Cs 1.0 1.2 
CUP n.a. 76.6 
Other 0.7 16.1 
Blank/Null 0.7 7.9 
Abstention 15.4 17.1 
Total 14.0 41.1 
Source: Centre for Opinion Studies. 2006: Opinion Barometer 363. 2015: Opinion Barometer 
804. http://ceo.gencat.cat/ 
Not applicable (n.a.) if the party did not run. 
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C. Empirical models 
Next, we report the exact estimates of different models explained in the article. Table 
G shows the aggregate-level interaction models between the state of the economy 
and the political dynamics (see section 5.1 in the manuscript). Table H-L display the 
exact estimates employed to create in Figure 4 in the manuscript (individual-level 
analysis; section 5.2). Table H shows the effect of being unemployed on support for 
secession; Table I shows the effect of earning less than 1000 euros on support for 
secession; Table J shows the effect of retrospective evaluation of personal economic 
situation on support for secession; Table K shows the effect of considering 
unemployment the most important problem on support for secession; and Table L 
shows the effect of belonging to the middle class on support for secession.  
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D. Additional figures 
 
Figure A: Spatial distribution of growth rate of estimated support for 
independence between 2005 and 2016 
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1 These surveys were administered by the Centre dEstudis dOpinió (CEO) of 
the Generalitat de Catalunya (Regional government). Each CEO survey has 
between 1,500 and 2,500 interviews. The sample design employs stratified 
sampling by provinces and size of municipality, with the selection of individuals 
based on quotas of gender, age and place of birth. This makes the survey fairly 
representative at lower levels of aggregation (municipalities). The method of 
data collection is in-person. To account for non-representativeness in some 
municipalities, we repeated the analyses excluding municipalities that have very 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                
small number of interviews. Additionally, we also changed the year cut-off to 
2007 and 2014. In all cases, results remained robust. 
2 The other options are: A Region of Spain, An Autonomous Community, and 
A federal state within Spain. Although this question underestimates 
secessionist support by not directly asking about individuals intended 
behaviour in a referendum of independence, it has been consistently asked 
since 2004. In 2012, the CEO institute started asking about the intended vote in 
a referendum of independence. If we use this other question, our results do not 
change.    
3 One caveat of this approach is that, in each of the provinces, survey 
respondents from urban areas may be overrepresented and, therefore, 
estimated support for secession mainly reflects preferences from cities. 
Although this does not seem to be the case in the CEO surveys, as a 
robustness check we also weighted support for secession in non-urban areas to 
better reflect the urban-rural divide. Results are virtually the same. 
